“Navalny Case”: a spark to start the fire

Recently we have reached a new chapter of “Navalny Case” - a letter from the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection of Germany to the Prosecutor General’s Office of Russia on the matter in question was sent. Unfortunately, it barely moved the case to conclusion, if at all, as the letter did not contain any substantial answers to the questions asked by the Russian Side. According to Russian MFA Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, “it only reaffirms Berlin’s avoidance of constructive collaboration to clarify the real circumstances of the incident with the Russian citizen. It is surprising that it has taken the German law enforcement bodies nearly three months to formulate this short runaround reply”. As “Navalny case’ is, apparently, far from its conclusion, we can still avail ourselves of the opportunity to explore is background. The algorithms behind the case are remarkably old-fashioned, so to say, and overused. This makes them only that much more interesting to talk about. Let us explain.

As you may read in the newspapers from time to time, the Nord Stream 2 project of a new pipeline transporting the Russian gas to Europe is almost complete which means that Germany is about to become Europe’s main gas hub. Since day one of Nord Stream 2 construction, US wanted, without even making a secret of it, to prevent this project from being implemented and has been trying to halt it with any means at hand for quite a simple reason – replace Russia’s gas supplies with its own, much more expensive, liquified gas. Yet Germany remained determined to complete Nord Stream 2 - the US just didn’t have a single convincing argument to make it procure American energy. Even constant repeating of the “Russian threat” mantra & attempts to pass off a purely economic project as a sort of “evil scheme to spread political influence” didn’t work. Just as they didn’t in 1980s. That’s right, Nord Stream 2 is not the first Russian gas pipeline to cause irritation, threats and sanctions coming from the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.

In 1978 the USSR proposed the project of Trans-Siberian export gas pipeline. The negotiations on the project between the Soviet side and German Ruhrgas with French Gaz de France from the European side began in 1980 and lasted until the first half of 1981. On July 24, 1981, West Germany, which Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was willing to preserve the achievements of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik (Eastern Policy), and USSR concluded a framework agreement on the deal. Take a guess what happened next and what was Washington’s reaction? Ronald Reagan, the then President of the United States, saw it as a purely political project and so did the CIA which assessed that “the project furthers Soviet goals of drawing Western Europe into a closer political-economic relationship. The pipeline would be a major new element in Soviet-West European relations. It would provide the Soviets one additional pressure point they could use as part of a broader diplomatic offensive to persuade the West Europeans to accept their viewpoint on East-West issues”. Ronald Reagan was indeed determined to convince the Europeans to abandon the project, but it seems now that even he himself knew all along that the US hadn’t have an ace up its sleeve to make Europe bend to its will. Moreover, Washington hardly could do anything to seriously hinder the project’s implementation. Reagan said it himself at US National Security Council meeting on December 22, 1981: “The thing that bothers me, the constant question is, that we continue to deplore [on martial law in Poland] but isn’t there anything we can do in practice? Those “chicken littles” in Europe, will they still be “chicken littles” if we lead and ask them to follow our lead?”.

Just as President Reagan felt, despite all his speeches and appeals, the Europeans were not too impressed by Washington’s reasoning with regards to why they should throw a gas deal with the USSR in the garbage-can. US President even used the 7^th G7 Summit in Ottawa to din into European politicians’ ears but failed to break through to them. Reagan’s administration also proposed to Germany to replace the gas from Soviet Union with coal supplies from US. This proposal was turned down however – it was much more expensive and harder to implement. What else could Washington do?

The decision that R.Reagan eventually came up with was the introduction of sanctions against the USSR. The official reasoning was the martial law in Poland. In reality though, the objective was to stop the Trans-Siberian Pipeline. The anti-Soviet sanctions proved to be insufficient, so on June 22, 1982 they had been extended on all the foreign firms exporting equipment involving American technologies. Here is what US writer and journalist Oliver C.Dziggel mentions in his article on the matter: “For close to two years, the United States maintained economic sanctions which were aimed at the Soviet Union but which in their application most directly affected its four closest allies in the Western world.” If you still doubt that Poland wasn’t the real reason behind Reagan’s actions then take this little fact into consideration: the sanctions were lifted on 13 November 1982 when the situation in Poland hardly changed.

The similarities between the two gas projects - the Trans-Siberian Pipeline and Nord Stream 2 - are striking. Let’s summarize: perceiving an economic project as a political one and imposing such perception on others? Check. Introduction of sanctions on both Russia/USSR and European states after they didn’t listen to what Washington said? Check. Using an event which is completely unrelated to gas in order to paint a picture of “evil Russians”? Check. This brings us back to the incident with Alexey Navalny.

The whole story with “Navalny’s poisoning with Novichok” is an attempt to shift the balance of general public’s and ruling elites’ opinion in the favour of Nord Stream 2’s sanctions. It is no coincidence that the calls to cancel the pipeline project began practically immediately after the alleged poisoning of Navalny became public. Folding up Nord Stream 2 was described as “the only way to punish Putin properly”. For example, here is what Norbert Roettgen, head of the German parliament’s foreign affairs committee, said: “After the poisoning of Navalny we need a strong European answer, which Putin understands: The EU should jointly decide to stop Nord Stream 2.”. Just ask yourself: how can he be so sure that Putin will only understand this answer? While you at it, ask this: how can he be sure that Putin is guilty and needs to be punished in the first place? Asking questions is a good way to resist this “hysteria storm” and see the real picture: incident with Navalny could not be a coincidence – the timing is just too perfect. It is a desperate attempt to stop the nearly completed Nord Stream 2. Once is chance, twice is coincidence, third time is a pattern. A pattern of playing on people’s emotions to make them jump to conclusions and decisions that they were initially reluctant to accept.

It seems that Navalny was chosen as a “sacred victim” this time – a spark that was supposed to start the flame of mass hysteria. If that turns out to be true then a whole series of questions arises: why Navalny, exactly? Could it be that he is seemingly the dearest person to the West in Russia? If yes, then why? Is that because the bet in some sort of political game was on him? Again, if yes, why put him in danger then? Could it be that it’s because the “bet” was misplaced, (because Navalny’s approval rating varies from to 2 to 4% he is hardly a rival to Russian President in terms of public support) and someone decided to use him in a different way? As a saying goes: “a tuft of hair from a mangy mare”.

As we said in our previous piece, for Russia, poisoning Navalny makes absolutely no sense. But it doesn’t mean that it’s senseless – perhaps, someone else hopes to benefit from it. What is clear though is that “Navalny Case” was used to wind up emotions, to shift it from the level of rational thinking to irrationality. The opponents of Nord Stream 2 apparently ran out of arguments and facts to prove their point, so they seem to have decided to move the situation on the emotional level, where arguments and facts are overshadowed by, most often, indignation. It is an old and a well-known political technology which was used on numerous occasions and in a variety of situations in the past. Should our valued readers express interest in the topic, we could speak more on that.